Value Nothing: A Military Doctrine

One of the interesting things I've been hearing from more than one place regarding Israel's war in Lebanon is that regardless of the merits of Israel's actions, it was going to happen once the IDF's soldiers were kidnapped because Israel, more than other countries, has a deep, abiding connection with each and every soldier that puts on the uniform.

(We'll leave aside, for the moment, the fact that other IDF soldiers had been kidnapped before without this kind of gotterdammerung.)

If this is true - if Olmert believed, either because of priniciple or political expediency, that he had to do this because of the precious lives of Israeli soldiers - then it simply shows that this attachment to soldiers' lives is positively harmful to Israel's interests.

Let's start with the specific case: Whether you agree with the opinion that "Hezbollah won" or not, arguing that Israel has won a lasting victory in this case is difficult at best. Most observers see this as having empowered Hezbollah politically, while seriously undermining Israel's defensive credibility. If Israel embarked on this foolish war because of an attachment to two soldiers, and got a couple dozen of its own soldiers killed in the process, well that's just dumb. It served neither the immediate tactical goal (getting the soldiers back, or more generally preserving soldiers lives) nor the strategic goal (defeating the as-yet undefeated Hezbollah.)

This is not meant to be a callous argument along the lines of "it's the soldier's job to die", or more classically, "dulce et decorum est pro patria mori." Rather, it's important that when states engage in international affairs, they not have too many "lines in the sand". The refusal to negotiate with terrorists is, as always, a instinctively satisfying response. It is also, as always, incredibly stupid. To go to war with all of Lebanon over 2 soldiers, or destroy Falluja over 4 mercenaries, is simply insane. It shows the enemy that they can control you, or at least goad you in to a response that you might not have thought fully through.

If Olmert or Bush had been in charge of facing down the USSR during the Cold War, I fear we probably wouldn't have survived.

Bush, 1962: The Rooskies have put missiles in Cuba? Fuck 'em, let's get our missiles in the air!

A few days ago, Kevin Drum wrote that:

It's human nature to demand action following an attack. Any action. Counseling restraint in the hope that it will pay off in the long run is politically ruinous.

Well, that's not exactly true, is it? Or at least, it explains a whole lot less than Kevin might think. Nobody now argues that the most reasonable response after the Tonkin Gulf was to begin a massive, decade-long war to... do what, exactly in Vietnam? Less understood is that there were voices in 1964 who were saying exactly the same thing, and if President Johnson had joined them (after running against war in Vietnam, after all) he could very well have held off any public clamour for war that might have developed.

More broadly, counseling restraint may be politically ruinous, but practicing restraint is quite another thing. Israel could have not changed its rhetoric one bit, but instead conducted a series of limited air strikes against Hezbollah targets, and would be far, far ahead of where it is now. Or, to put it more simply: If you can't actually talk to the public about restraint, that doesn't mean you can't lie and be restrained anyway. Indeed, the public may thank you for it later.