Should the IDF lose its aura of invincibility in American eyes, Israel's perceived value as an ally could decline sharply. This reassessment in Washington, when combined with a continuing and even heightened determination by Arab states and jihadists to destroy Israel, would be catastrophic for its security.I'd argue with the idea that America's alliance with Israel has ever been based on Israel's military utility. In fact, I think the exact opposite is true - America's alliance with Israel has been maintained even in the face of pretty severe conflicts with America's other interests. I actually don't think this is a bad thing, but it certainly eliminates the idea that the US-Israeli alliance is performance-based in any way. I don't remember the US support for Israel waning after the 1973 debacle.
As Israel's leaders once understood, the Washington-Jerusalem strategic partnership has always been nurtured by a steady stream of Israeli successes, both in defending its own security and in advancing American interests. These successes ranged from humbling the Soviet Union's Cold War Arab clients, proving the superiority of America's weapons over Russia's (the IDF's 1982 downing of 85 Syrian MIGs being a perfect case in point), to providing invaluable intelligence and being a democracy in a sea of autocracies.Except, of course, that Osirak failed to substantially set back Iraqi nuclear ambitions. Strike two for the IDF's performance. It could be argued that the US perceived Osirak to be a success, but arguing that the IDF needs to be perceived to be victorious in their pursuits is quite different from arguint that the IDF needs to actually win.
Israel's successful 1981 Osirak mission was another excellent example of its strategic value in the Middle East. An Israel that could defang Saddam's nuclear program could also credibly offer the United States help against Iran's looming nuclear threat.
By contrast, Israel's inability to defeat Hezbollah, at least at the tactical and operational level, makes it look less like a valuable ally and more like a liability.I don't see how this could possibly be true. Whether or not Israel "wins" in Lebanon (whatever that would look like) the IDF is still the most advanced military in the region. Even if the IDF loses south of the Litani river, Israel has a vital strategic role in the Middle East.
This is particularly the case because of the impact - well understood in Washington particularly in the post-September 11 environment - of Arab perceptions of Israeli strength or weakness on their assessment of U.S. capabilities. The Bush administration's pro-democracy strategy also makes it far more difficult for it to ignore the stridently anti-Israeli views expressed by the proto-democratic governments in Iraq and Lebanon.BWAHAHAHA!!!! No, seriously? Every American president since, oh, FDR has said he was pro-Democracy, and I don't remember any of them seriously debating whether or not a "proto-democracy" needed to be heard before the bombs started falling.
Whether or not Lebanon now becomes an anti-Israeli country, the US will support Israel. Period. The idea that Bush's farcial, delusional commitment to "democracy" will get in the way of that is absurd. Not quite as absurd as what follows in this abortion of an op-ed:
The political sands, however, are shifting. Anti-Israeli sentiments are rife among Democrats - 59 percent want the U.S. to be more "evenhanded" in the Middle East - some of whom appear to be convinced that the Bush administration's deposition of Saddam Hussein was masterminded by "neo-conservatives" in Israel's interest.Because Lamont's support for Israel has been even more vocal than Liberman's? That simply makes no sense. The Dems still support Israel, and will continue to. And you've got to love the not-so-sly implication of anti-semitism in seeing people who call themselves neo-cons as, well, neo-cons.
Senator Joseph Lieberman's August 8 loss in the Connecticut primary, and the evident triumph of the Democrats' neo-McGovernite wing, signal trouble ahead.
Finally, we get to the centre of this turd:
The radical Islamist belief that the West is a "weak horse" has, of course, also been reinforced by the continuing insurgency in Iraq and the rising peace movements in Europe and the United States, but Israel is on the front line. Any conclusion of the current conflict on terms that leave Hezbollah unbowed would further undercut the West's credibility, and would squander much of the deterrent effect of Israel's past military successes from 1948 to the present.Ah yes, it's got it all: The "weak horse" idea, the polite formulation of the idea that "the Arabs only understand force"; the stab in the back lie about anti-war movements; and the idea that if Israel ends the war now, the IDF's credibility will be shot. The first two ideas aren't worth responding to.
And I've got some sad news for anyone who thinks the IDF's credibility can be rescued from this farce: It can't. The moment the IDF had to pull out from Bint Jbeil and regroup after fierce Hezbollah resistance, Hezbollah had seriously dented Israeli deterrence. When the Israeli government started calling for international help - something Israel has never done before - deterrence was dead, rotting, and starting to stink up the joint.
There was a much smarter column in Haaretz today, but that's for another post.
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